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I. Introduction
The purpose of this survey is to provide an overview of
developments in EU State aid law in 2015. In previous
editions, we have typically looked at both legislative and
case law developments. However, 2015 was a year
marked of no legislative developments in the field of
State aid law. This is not surprising given that the Com-
mission had only just finalised implementing the State
aid modernisation package in 2014.
In light of this, we will focus this year’s edition of the
survey on the most interesting State aid cases decided on
by the General Court (GC) and the Court of Justice
(CJEU) of the European Union over the last 12 months.
Some of these judgments annul or confirm decisions
taken by the European Commission in previous years,
and others are responses to preliminary references for-
mulated by national courts in the context of national
disputes.
Throughout the last 12 months, the European courts
have been called upon to provide guidance to national
courts or rule on the legality of Commission decisions in
the field of EU State aid control. In light of the high
number of judgments issued in this period, we limit our
analysis to those cases which we deem to be more inter-
esting because of the issues covered or the types of na-
tional measures that came under the Courts’ scrutiny.
To this end, the judgments covered in this section
concern:
† the concept of ‘State intervention or through State
resources’;
† the requirement of ‘selectivity’;
† the concept of advantage, specifically with respect to
the private investor principle;
† issues pertaining to the compensation for SGEI or
public service obligations;
† the concept of ‘serious difficulties’;
† issues pertaining to the recovery of State aid;
† the res judicata principle.
II. State intervention or through State
resources
A. Case C-242/13 Commerz Nederland v
Havenbedrijft Rotterdam
On 17 September 2014, the CJEU issued a preliminary
ruling concerning the interpretation of the condition of
State imputability.1 The director of a port authority,
which operates as a service department of the municipal-
ity of Rotterdam, agreed to act as a guarantor for a EUR
25 million credit granted to RDM Vehicles by Commerz
Nederland for manufacture of an armoured vehicle. This
guarantee is at the centre of the national dispute that
gave rise to the preliminary reference.
The national court observed that although the direct-
or had the power to grant the guarantee pursuant to
civil law, he did so arbitrarily in this instance, he deliber-
ately kept the provision of the guarantee secret, and he
disregarded the statutes of the port authority by failing to
seek approval of the grant from the supervisory board.
In addition, the referring court assumed that the muni-
cipality of Rotterdam did not wish for the guarantee to
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Key Points
† With respect to legislation, there has been, in the
last 12 months, no significant development on
State aid, following the adoption of the State aid
modernisation package in 2014.
† The EU case law has clarified the general conditions
for the application of the Treaty provisions on State
aid – in particular, the conditions of State inter-
vention and State resources, the private investor
principle and the requirement of selectivity.
† New developments are also worthwhile to note
with respect to the compensation of public service
obligations, the res judicata principle and the re-
covery of unlawful aid.
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be provided. Therefore, the national court sought to
determine whether these circumstances were such as to
exclude the condition of State imputability.
The CJEU observed that the provision of the guaran-
tee involved a commitment of State resources, within the
meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, because it carries a
‘sufficiently real economic risk’ capable of resulting in
costs for the port authority and that the latter was
wholly owned, at the material time, by the municipality
of Rotterdam. The Court then reiterated its case law in
France v Commission, known as ‘Stardust Marine’ (C-
482/99, EU:C:2002:294), and noted that it was up to the
national court to determine, on the basis of that case law,
whether it could be inferred from the body evidence
before it that the condition of State imputability had been
satisfied (paras 30–34 of the judgment).
That being, it is worth noting that the Court ex-
pressed some scepticism regarding the referring court’s
assertion that the municipality of Rotterdam had not
been involved in the provision of the guarantee. In this
sense, the Court noted that the organisational links
between the port authority and municipality of Rotter-
dam ‘tend to demonstrate, in principle, that the public
authorities were involved or that it was unlikely that they
were not involved in the provision of such guarantees’.
Moreover, the CJEU went on to state that the fact that
the sole director of the public undertaking acted im-
properly does not, of itself, exclude State involvement.
To accept such a premise would, as noted by the AG and
accepted by the Court, weaken the ‘effectiveness of rules
on state aid’ (paras 35–38 of the judgment).
B. Case C-275/13 Elcoga´s SA v Administracio´n
del Estado and Iberdrola SA
On 22 October 2014, the CJEU issued a ruling in response
to a preliminary reference from the Spanish Supreme
Court concerning the interpretation of the condition of a
measure, which entails intervention by the State, and the
use of State resources for the purposes of Article 107 (1)
TFEU.2
Elcoga´s owned a thermal power plant, which operates
by virtue of the carbonisation of coal and other alterna-
tive fuels. Given the extra costs generated by the use of
this technology, Spain introduced a financing mechan-
ism, which sought to compensate electricity companies
that incurred in these extra costs. The funds used to
compensate these extra costs originated from an electri-
city tariff charged to all end-consumers, and were to be
distributed by a public entity in accordance with prede-
termined legal criteria. On 28 December 2010, by virtue
of an administrative decision, Elcoga´s lost the benefit of
this financing mechanism. Elcoga´s therefore appealed
the decision up to the Supreme Court, and it is with this
context in mind that the Supreme Court referred a ques-
tion of interpretation to the CJEU.
In line with the case law, the Court concluded that
given that the financing mechanism was established and
regulated by law, the mechanism was imputable to the
State. Similarly, the Court pointed out that a compensa-
tion mechanism for extra costs, whose funding is pro-
vided for by all end-consumers of electricity in the
national territory and where the funds are distributed by
a public entity, constitutes an intervention by the State
or through State resources. The Court distinguished the
mechanism in question from the measure under scrutiny
in Preussen Elektra (C-379/98, EU: C: 2008:413). Firstly,
in the latter case, the private undertakings only had a
purchase obligation using their own financial resources.
Secondly, the funds in question in that case were not
State resources since they were not at any time under
public control and there was no mechanism established
and regulated by the Member State, for offsetting the
additional costs arising from that obligation to purchase
and through which the State offered those private opera-
tors the certain prospect that the additional costs would
be covered in full (paras 23, 30, and 32 of the judgment).
This case, in the wake of previous cases such as Vent
de Cole`re!3 (where the Court confirmed the existence of
aid) and Doux Elevage4 (where the Court confirmed that
there was no aid), shows how Member States have to pay
the price of State aid control should they decide to control
all the range of steps leading to the financing of certain
policies (from the levy of contribution, to the distribution
and allocation of benefits), instead of leaving private
parties carrying out these steps.
C. Case C-518/13 Eventech v Parking
Adjudicator
On 14 January 2015, the CJEU issued a ruling in re-
sponse to the English Court of Appeals preliminary ref-
erence concerning the interpretation of Article 107 (1)
TFEU.5 The case focusses on the lawfulness of a policy
implemented by Transport for London (‘TfL’) and by
the majority of London Boroughs which consists in per-
2 Case C-275/13 Elcogas SA v Administracio´n del Estado and Iberdrola SA,
EU:C:2014:2314.
3 Case C-262/12 Vent de Cole`re v Ministre de l’E´cologie, du De´veloppement
durable, des Transports et du Logement, Ministre de l’E´conomie, des Finances
et de l’Industrie, EU:C:2013:851.
4 C-677/11, Doux E´levage SNC & Others v CIDEF, EU: C: 2013:348.
5 Case C-518/13 Eventech v Parking Adjudicator, EU: C: 2015:9.
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mitting Black Cabs to use most London bus lanes during
the hours when the bus lane restrictions are operational,
while prohibiting private hire vehicles (‘minicabs’) from
using those bus lanes, except for the purpose of picking
up and setting down passengers who have pre-booked
such a vehicle.
Concerning the condition of State resources, Eventech
Ltd an operator of minicabs—argued that the bus lanes
policy entailed budgetary burdens. Eventech based this
conclusion on two factors: (i) the preferential access of
Black Cabs to infrastructure belonging to the State,
namely the London bus lanes, for the use of which those
taxis are not charged; and (ii) Black Cabs are exempted
from any liability to pay fines when they use those bus
lanes.
The CJEU dismissed both of these arguments. Firstly,
the fact that Black Cabs do not pay fines is a simple con-
sequence of the legal system characterising their conduct
as being lawful. Thus, unlike in Commission v Nether-
lands (C-279/08 P, EU: C: 2011:551), the fact that Black
Cabs were not being fined for lawfully occupying the bus
lanes did not constitute an additional burden for the
public authorities. Secondly, the public authorities do
not operate the bus lanes commercially given that their
use is free of charge. It follows, therefore, that public
authorities did not forgo revenue that they would have
otherwise received in the absence of the bus lane policy
(paras 38–43 of the judgment).
The CJEU noted in particular that ‘where the State, in
order to pursue the realisation of an objective laid down
by that State’s legislation, grants a right of privileged access
to public infrastructure which is not operated commercial-
ly by the public authorities to users of that infrastructure,
the State does not necessarily confer an economic advan-
tage’ (para 48 of the judgment). National public author-
ities alone are competent for identifying the objective
pursued, and they must enjoy a margin of discretion in
determining whether it is necessary, in order to achieve the
objective pursued, to forgo possible revenue and also as
regards how the appropriate criteria for the granting of the
right, which must be determined in advance in a transpar-
ent and non-discriminatory manner, are to be identified.6
The Court found that, given the characteristics of Black
Cabs, the competent national authorities could reasonably
take the view that the access of those taxis to bus lanes is
liable to enhance the efficiency of the London road trans-
port system and that, consequently, the criterion for the
granting of the right at issue, namely the provision of taxi
services in London, is liable to achieve the realisation of
the objective concerned (paras 48–52 of the judgment).
III. Selectivity
A. Case T-219/10 Autogrill SA v Commission and
Case T-399/11 Banco Santander—Stantusa v
Commission
On 7 November 2014, the GC annulled the Commis-
sion’s decisions declaring a provision in the Spanish Cor-
porate Tax law as unlawful and incompatible State aid.7
The Spanish provision established that if an undertaking
that is taxable in Spain acquires a shareholding of at least
5 per cent in a ‘foreign company’ and holds it uninter-
ruptedly for at least 1 year, the goodwill resulting from
that shareholding, which is recorded in the undertaking’s
accounts as a separate intangible asset, may be deducted,
in the form of an amortisation, from the basis of assess-
ment for the corporate tax for which the undertaking is
liable. The measure at issue states that to qualify as a
‘foreign company’, a company must be subject to a similar
tax to the tax applicable in Spain and its income must
derive mainly from business activities carried out abroad.
The GC found that the Commission had erred when
finding that the condition of selectivity had been ful-
filled. In this sense, the GC noted that the existence, even
if it were established, of a derogation from or exception to
the reference framework identified by the Commission
cannot, in itself, establish that the measure at issue is se-
lective, since that measure is available, a priori, to any
undertaking. Indeed, the measure at issue was applicable
to all shareholdings of at least 5 per cent in foreign com-
panies, which were held for an uninterrupted period of at
least 1 year. It was, therefore, not aimed at any particular
category of undertakings or production, but at a category
of economic transactions. In order to benefit from this
measure, all an undertaking needed to do was to purchase
shares in a foreign company, without having to change
the nature of its activity. In this sense, the GC recalled
that in Adria-Wien Pipeline (C-143/99, EU: C: 2001:598),
the Court had already established that a measure that is
applicable regardless of the nature of the activity of the
undertakings would not be, in principle, selective (paras
6 In this case, the Court observed that the right of privileged access has an
economic value, and it was granted by the competent traffic authority.
Furthermore, it observed that it is stated in the relevant road traffic
legislation that the objective pursued by the legislation at issue is that of
ensuring a safe and efficient transport system; that neither the road
network concerned nor the bus lanes are operated commercially; that the
criterion for granting that right is that of providing taxi services in London;
that that criterion was established in advance and in a transparent manner;
and, last, that all the providers of such services are treated equally.
7 Case T-219/10 Autogrill SA v Commission, EU:T:2014:939; Case T-399/11
Banco Santander—Stantusa v Commission, EU:T:2014:938.
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52–57 of the judgment in Autogrill and paras 56–61 of
the judgment in Banca Santander).
In addition, unlike the measure at issue in Diputacion
Foral de Alava (Joined cases T-227/01 to 229/01, T-265/
01, T-266/01 and T-270/01, EU: T: 2009:315), the mea-
sure in this instance did not impose a requirement,
which would restrict the benefit of the derogation only
to undertakings that possess a predetermined sufficient
amount of financial resources. Lastly, the GC recalled that
in Germany v Commission (C-156/98, EU:C:2000:467), the
CJEU found that tax concession in favour of taxpayers who
sold certain financial assets and could offset the resulting
profit in the case of shareholding acquisitions in capital
companies having their registered office in certain regions
conferred on those taxpayers an advantage which, as a
general measure applicable without distinction to all eco-
nomically active persons, did not constitute aid within the
meaning of the relevant provisions of the Treaty (paras 59
and 60 of the judgment in Autogrill and paras 62–64 of the
judgment in Banca Santander).
The Commission appealed these two judgments
(C-20/15 P and C-21/15 P).
B. Case C-518/13 Eventech v Parking Adjudicator
In its judgment of 14 January 2015 mentioned above with
respect to the condition of transfer of State resources, the
CJEU also examined the issue of selectivity.
With regard to that condition, although it would be
up to the referring Court to determine whether Black
Cabs and minicabs are in a comparable situation, the
Court nevertheless decided to issue some guidance. In this
regard, the CJEU noted that:
the identification of the factual and legal situation of Black
Cabs and minicabs cannot be confined to that prevailing in
the market sector in which those two categories of conveyors of
passengers are in direct competition, namely the pre-booking
sector. It cannot seriously be doubted that all the journeys
made by Black Cabs and minicabs are liable to affect the safety
and efficiency of the transport system on all the road traffic
routes in London (para 59 of the judgment).
Secondly, the Court pointed out ‘by virtue of their legal
status, only Black Cabs can play for hire; they are subject
to the rule of “compellability”; they must be recognisable
and capable of conveying persons in wheelchairs, and their
drivers must set the fares for their services by means of a
taxi meter and have a particularly thorough knowledge of
the city of London’ (para 60 of the judgment). On that
basis, Black Cabs and minicabs are therefore in factual
and legal situations, which are sufficiently distinct to
permit the view that they are not comparable and that
the bus lanes policy therefore does not confer a selective
economic advantage on Black Cabs (paras 59–61 of the
judgment).
C. Case 672/13 OTP Bank Nyrt v Magyar A´llam
and Magyar A´llamkincsta´r
On 19 March 2015, the CJEU adopted a judgment re-
sponding to the Hungarian court’s preliminary reference
seeking to ascertain whether a State guarantee intended to
facilitate access to housing, granted exclusively to credit
institutions constituted State aid within the meaning of
Article 107(1) TFEU.8
The 2001 Hungarian decree regulated the aids intended
to facilitate access to housing and granted to credit insti-
tutions the exclusive right to grant loans, to determine the
forms of reimbursement and the aids. In exchange, the
State would guarantee the loan. Prior to the 2011 amend-
ment, the Hungarian State was, under certain conditions,
also required to reimburse the credit institution 80 per
cent of the amount of the loan paid by that institution
and, which had become irrecoverable, together with inter-
est and expenses on that loan.
The Court found that the measure constituted prima
facie State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
However, it left to the referring court the task of ascertain-
ing whether the measure was in fact selective following the
amendment of the 2001 Decree. In particular, the referring
court would need to determine whether the amendment
may have enabled other economic operators other than
credit institutions to benefit the guarantee and, in the af-
firmative, whether that fact may call into question the se-
lective nature of the measure (para 79 of the judgment).
D. C-15/14 P European Commission v MOL
Magyar Olaj-e´s Ga´zipari Nyrt
On 22 December 2005, MOL, a Hungarian mining
company, and the Minister for mines concluded an
agreement, which extended the deadline by 5 years for
MOL to start exploiting the 12 hydrocarbon fields not
yet exploited. In exchange, MOL would, as stipulated in
the Hungarian law, pay a special fee to the State (1.2
times the regular fee). This regular mining fee was ini-
tially regulated at 12 per cent in 1993. In 2008, the new
law set a mining fee of 30 per cent for the deposits
exploited between 1998 and 2007. Thus, MOL would pay
a fee slightly higher than 12 per cent and not the 30 per
cent fee. Following an investigation, the Commission con-
8 Case 672/13 OTP Bank Nyrt v Magyar A´llam and Magyar A´llamkincsta´r,
EU:C:2015:185.
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cluded that the 2005 agreement and the 2008 amendment
constituted State aid. The Commission’s decision was
challenged, and the GC annulled the decision because the
measure in question was not selective. On 4 June 2015,
the CJEU confirmed the GC’s judgment on appeal by the
Commission.9
As regards selectivity, the CJEU observed that when it
comes to a measure in the form of a general scheme of
aid, which confers an advantage of general application,
one must identify whether it does so to the exclusive
benefit of certain undertakings or certain sectors of ac-
tivity. Therefore, in order to determine whether the con-
dition of selectivity is met, one must ascertain whether
the procedure for concluding and setting the terms of
condition of the extension agreement, distinguishes
between operators that are ‘in the light of the objective of
the measure, in a comparable factual and legal situation’
(para 22 of the judgment) and whether that distinction
is not justified by the nature and general scheme of the
system at issue. The CJEU dismissed the Commission’s
arguments seeking to apply the case law relating to
provisions of national law granting relief on taxes or
other charges to the case at hand. The CJEU shared
Advocate General Wahl’s view according to which
there is a fundamental difference between, on the one hand,
the assessment of the selectivity of general schemes for exemp-
tion or relief, which, by definition, confer an advantage, and,
on the other, the assessment of the selectivity of optional provi-
sions of national law prescribing the imposition of additional
charges. In cases in which the national authorities impose such
charges in order to maintain equal treatment between opera-
tors, the simple fact that those authorities enjoy discretion
defined by law, and not unlimited, as the Commission claimed
in its appeal, cannot be sufficient to establish that the corre-
sponding scheme is selective (para 64 of the Opinion).
Therefore, contrary to the Commission’s assertions, the
CJEU confirmed the GC’s finding that the margin of as-
sessment at issue in the present case allows the fixing of
an additional charge imposed on economic operators in
order to take account of the imperatives arising from the
principle of equal treatment, and can be distinguished,
by its very nature, from cases in which the exercise of such
a margin is connected with the grant of an advantage in
favour of a specific economic operator (paras 60–65 of
the judgment).
Contrary to the Commission’s view, the Court also
found that the fact that rates to be paid by MOLwere the
result of a negotiation did not suffice to confer a selective
character to the extension agreement. The agreement
would only have a selective character ‘if the Hungarian
authorities had exercised their margin of assessment in
such a way as to favour MOL by agreeing to a low fee level
without any objective reason having regard to the rationale
of increasing fees in the event of an extension of authorisa-
tion and to the detriment of any other operator having
sought to extend its mining rights or, if there is no such
operator, where there is concrete evidence that unjustified
favourable treatment has been reserved to MOL’ (para 34
of the judgment). The CJEU observed that the GC had
analysed rates stipulated under that agreement and
found that there was no evidence of unjustified preferen-
tial treatment towards MOL and that therefore it could
not be assumed that MOLwas afforded favourable treat-
ment in relation to any other undertaking that was
potentially in a comparable situation (paras 66 and 67 of
the judgment).
The CJEU then dismissed the Commission’s plea
according to which the GC had somehow suggested,
contrary to the case law, that the reliance of a measure
on objective criteria necessarily rules out selectivity. The
Court agreed with MOL that the Commission had
misread the GC judgment and that, therefore, the plea
was unfounded. Indeed, when determining whether the
mining was set on the basis of objective criteria, the GC
had made the following observations (paras 76 and 77 of
the judgment):
- the Mining Act was drafted in general terms as
regards the undertakings eligible for the extension of
mining rights;
- the fact that MOL was the only undertaking to have
concluded an extension agreement in the hydrocar-
bons sector did not necessarily constitute evidence of
selectivity, since the criteria for concluding such an
agreement are objective and applicable to any poten-
tially interested operator;
- the absence of other agreements may result from
decisions by undertakings themselves not to apply
for an extension of mining rights;
- the mining fees set for the term of the 2005 agree-
ment stem simply from the application of the provi-
sions of the Mining Act.
Finally, the CJEU dismissed the Commission’s plea
which essentially seeks to argue that the 2008 amend-
ment which introduced higher rates should have been
taken into consideration when assessing the selective
nature of the measure. In other words, the 2005 agree-
ment and the 2008 would constitute a single State aid
9 C-15/14 P European Commission v MOL Magyar Olaj- e´s Ga´zipari Nyrt,
EU:C:2015:362.
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measure. Here, the Court ratifies the GC’s reasoning
according to which ‘where a Member State concludes with
an economic operator an agreement which does not involve
any element of State aid for the purposes of Article 107
TFEU, the fact that, subsequently, conditions external to
such an agreement change in such a way that the operator
in question is in an advantageous position vis-a`-vis other
operators that have not concluded a similar agreement is
not a sufficient basis on which to conclude that, together,
the agreement and the subsequent modification of the con-
ditions external to that agreement can be regarded as con-
stituting State aid’ (para 89 of the judgment).
Lastly, the Court confirmed that, according to settled
case law, a single State aid measure can be comprised of
several elements if having regard to their chronology,
their purpose, and the circumstances of the undertaking
at the time of their intervention, they are so closely
linked to each other that they are inseparable from one
another. Such links were not present in this instance.10
E. Case T-251/11 Republic of Austria v European
Commission
Pursuant to Directive 2009/28/EC, Member States are
required to achieve, between now and 2020, mandatory
national targets for the overall share of energy from renew-
able sources in gross final consumption of energy. It is with
this Directive in mind that Austria amended the Green
Electricity Act (‘OSG’). Green electricity is purchased by a
centre for the regulation of green electricity. The perform-
ance of the tasks of this centre had been granted to a
limited company, the O¨MAG. In accordance with the
OSG, green electricity would be purchased at a guaranteed
fixed price, which is higher than the market price of electri-
city, is fixed each year by regulation by the Austrian Federal
Minister for the Economy and Employment.
The OSG provides that the costs incurred would be
transferred to electricity consumers. First, each final con-
sumer connected to the public grid was to pay an annual
contribution, irrespective of consumption. Second, elec-
tricity suppliers are required to buy from the O¨MAG all
the green electricity in its possession, also at a fixed price
set by regulation (‘the transfer price’). Those suppliers
are authorised then to pass on to their customers, in the
invoice price, the additional costs which they thereby
incur. However, under Article 22c of the amended O¨SG,
Austria proposed to establish a scheme of specific com-
pensation for energy-intensive businesses, limiting the
amounts payable by them to a specific amount, calcu-
lated, for each undertaking benefiting from the scheme,
according to the value of their net annual production.
The Commission found this particular mechanism to
amount to incompatible State aid, whereas the rest of
the measures were compatible with the Guidelines on
State aid for environmental protection. The GC rejected
Austria’s action for annulment and thereby confirmed the
Commission’s decision.11
With regard to the State imputability of the measure,
the Court observed that the Preussen Elektra case law is
not applicable because the measure in this case was not
comparable with that in Preussen Elektra. In fact, just
like Essent Netwerk Noord (C-206/06, EU: C: 2008:413),
the O¨MAG had been entrusted with administering the
system of aid to the production of electricity from re-
newable resources. Moreover, the Court observed that
the additional charge linked to purchase of green electri-
city ‘can be assimilated to a parafiscal levy on electricity in
Austria, which is set by a public authority, for purposes in the
public interest and according to an objective criterion’ (para
68 of the judgment). Lastly, the Court observed that al-
though the O¨MAG was an entity separate from the State,
it performed its tasks within a framework clearly defined
by the Austrian legislature and it was strictly controlled by
the Austrian authorities (paras 70–75 of the judgment).
As regards the condition of selectivity, the Court con-
firmed that there was no unity of object and purpose
between the general system of the Act and the special pro-
vision in Article 22c of that Act, which would enable that
provision to be regarded as constituting an integral part of
the general scheme and not as a special exemption in the
context of such a scheme. The general scheme had an eco-
logical objective, whereas ‘the measure placing a cap on the
contribution of energy-intensive businesses was intended to
“make the charges which [the system of aid for green electri-
city] entail[ed] bearable from an (. . .) economic and indus-
trial viewpoint” and to protect the undertakings particularly
affected by the system put in place’ (paras 105 and 106 of
the judgment). Finally, the Court noted that although any
undertaking can become an energy-intensive business, the
available data showed that in reality only a small propor-
tion of undertakings seemed to be able to benefit from the
exemption (para 120 of the judgment).
IV. Private investor principle
A. Case T-1/12 French Republic v European
Commission
On 15 January 2015, the GC upheld the Commission’s
decision finding that the restructuring and rescue aid
10 Paras 93–98 of the judgment. 11 Case T-251/11 Republic of Austria v European Commission, EU: T:
2014:1060.
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granted to SeaFrance was incompatible with the internal
market and ordering its recovery.12 The restructuring aid
consisted in a capital increase and two loans implemen-
ted through SNCF. The rescue aid, for its part, consisted
in a loan granted to SeaFrance through SNCF.
The Court held that, contrary to the applicants’ as-
sertions, the Commission was right to apply the private
investor test jointly to the recapitalisation and the rescue
aid. While the Commission reasoning was brief in the
Court’s eyes, the Court found that the Commission’s
findings regarding the chronology and the purpose of the
measures, and regarding SeaFrance’s situation, contained
no errors of assessment (para 41 of the judgment). The
loans at issue coincided with the recapitalisation and that
those three measures were set out in the same restructur-
ing plan submitted for consideration by the Commission
6 months after the implementation of the rescue aid (para
42 of the judgment). SeaFrance’s major financial difficul-
ties existed both when it received the rescue aid and when
the SNCF planned to grant it the three other aid mea-
sures set out in the restructuring plan (para 43 of the
judgment). Similarly, the loan had the same purpose as
the recapitalisation insofar as it ‘came under the logic of
restructuring SeaFrance, since it served to refinance and
to exercise the purchase option under the leasing contract
for the vessel Molie`re earlier than scheduled, and was thus
designed to reduce the operating costs linked to financing
the means of production’ (para 44 of the judgment).
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the Court upheld
the Commission’s view that the economic crisis and tigh-
tening of financial markets do not constitute ‘exceptional
circumstances’ for the purposes of triggering the excep-
tional circumstances clause of the guidelines. Similarly, the
Court found that Commission precedents cannot demon-
strate the concurrence of exceptional circumstances.
B. Case T-305/13 Servizi assicurativi del
commercio estero SpA (SACE) and Sace BT SpA
v European Commission
In February 2011, the Commission initiated a formal
investigation procedure with regard to four measures
taken by SACE (the Italian export-credit agency), a joint
stock company wholly owned by the Italian State, in
favour of its subsidiary SACE BT. The measures com-
prised the following: an initial capital injection into
SACE BT of EUR 100 million and a capital contribution
of EUR 5.8 million to BT’s reserve fund; the reinsurance
coverage of SACE BT; and two recapitalisations of SACE
BT in June and August 2009. In March 2013, the Com-
mission found that the reinsurance coverage and the two
recapitalisations amounted to State aid. SACE and SACE
BT challenged the Commission’s decision alleging that
the measures were not imputable to the Italian State and
that the Commission had breached the private investor
principle and its duty to state reasons. The GC upheld the
Commission decision on 25 June 2015.13
Regarding State imputability, the GC—in line with
the Stardust Marine case law—dismissed the applicants’
arguments and confirmed that the indicators relied on
by the Commission were sufficient to conclude that the
measures were imputable to the State. The Commission
relied on the following factors. First, the initial appoint-
ment of the members of the board of SACE required
the agreement of several important Ministries and two
members of the board also occupied simultaneously
executive positions in a Ministry. Second, SACE activ-
ities are not those exercised by a commercial company of
export-credit insurance in normal market conditions
but rather of a public insurance undertaking benefiting
from a derogatory statute and pursuing defined public
policy objectives of supporting the economy. Third, the
annual accounts of SACE are controlled by Italian Court
of auditors, and the Italian Ministry of Economy &
Finance had to submit a report of SACE’s activities on
an annual basis to the Italian Parliament. Fourth, SACE’s
forecasts were approved by the Comitato interminister-
iale per la programmazione economica (‘CIPE’). Fifth,
the Italian State’s 30 per cent interest in SACE BT
through SACE (paras 57–81 of the judgment).
With regard to the breach of the private investor prin-
ciple, the GC dismissed the applicants’ arguments
that the Commission’s finding that the reinsurance
coverage granted to SACE BT had been granted under
preferential pricing terms. Here, the Court made some
interesting observations regarding the principal of mutual
cooperation. Pursuant to this principle, a Member State is
required to provide to the Commission the information
that will allow the Commission to take a decision on
whether the measure at issue contains State aid. The
Commission, for its part, is under an obligation to
conduct a diligent and impartial examination of the infor-
mation submitted by the Member State (para 112 of the
judgment). In this particular case, the GC acknowledged
that the Commission had not taken into consideration a
note that had been prepared by SACE’s risk management
department to determine whether the estimated rate of
return of reinsurance agreement was in line with the
12 Case T-1/12 French Republic v European Commission, EU:T:2015:17. 13 Case T-305/13 Servizi assicurativi del commercio estero SpA (SACE) and
Sace BT SpA v European Commission, EU:T:2015:435.
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assumed risks. However, the Court argued that the Com-
mission could not be criticised for this since the applicants
had not argued during the administrative procedure that
SACE had performed an ex ante analysis of the profitabil-
ity of the reinsurance coverage measure. Moreover, the
Court suggested that the note contained information that
was not necessarily up to date since it failed to refer to the
financial crisis. Also, the note did not contain an analysis
of SACE’s risk exposure as a result of its 74.15 per cent
stake in the reinsurance agreement. Lastly, the Court
noted that the fact that SACE had not demonstrated that
it had performed an ex ante economic assessment of the
reinsurance coverage measure was not sufficient in itself to
conclude that SACE had not acted like private reinsurer in
a comparable situation (paras 117–123 of the judgment).
Concerning the method used by the Commission to
determine the amount of aid that needed to be recovered,
the Court observed that the Commission had simply
indicated that in line with its prior decisional practice,
the commission had to be at least 10% by private rein-
surers (para 144 of the judgment). The applicants
argued that the Commission had failed to reason why
the commission to be paid by SACE BT needed to be
10% higher than the commission applied by private
reinsurers. Here, the Commission had simply relied on
the methodology it had used in a previous decision with
regard to an aid granted by Portugal. The Court recalled
that according to established case law the characterisation
a measure as State aid has to be determined indepen-
dently of any prior decision taken by the Commission.
Therefore, the Commission could not simply refer to its
decisional practice, but had to outline the reasons as to
why the methodology was pertinent and clearly establish
the reasoning followed to apply it to the circumstances
of the case at hand. The Court then went on to observe
that there were clear differences between this case and the
Portuguese case and that the Commission decision lacked
reasoning as regards the possibility of transposing the
methodology used in the Portuguese to the case at hand
(paras 152–159 of the judgment).
Concerning the application of the private investor
principle to the two recapitalisation measures, the GC
confirmed that the Commission had not committed an
error of law when applying this principle. In this sense,
the GC noted that, in a context of economic crisis, when
applying this principle, account must be given to the fact
that it may not be possible to foresee in a reliable and
detailed way the evolution of the economic situation and
the results of the different operators. In these circum-
stances, therefore, the lack of detailed business plan con-
taining precise and complete forecasts of the future
profitability and a detailed analysis of the costs and ben-
efits does not in and of itself suffice to conclude that the
public investor did not act like a private investor. Simi-
larly, the Court did not exclude the possibility that a ra-
tional private investor might consider that the difficulties
of its subsidiary might be the result of the economic diffi-
culties of the market. However, even if this were the case,
a rational investor whose subsidiary had suffered import-
ant losses would conduct some form of prior economic
assessment and would look at other alternatives such as
sale or liquidation before deciding to inject more capital
(paras 179 and 180 of the judgment).
Lastly, the Court recalled that the margin of man-
oeuvre that the public investor enjoys in estimating the
possible profitability of a given project does not exonerate
it from conducting an appropriate economic assessment
based on the available data and of the foreseeable evolu-
tion (para 188 of the judgment).
This judgment is being appealed: Case C-472/15P.
C. Joined Cases T-425/04 RENV, T-444/04
RENV: France and Orange v Commission
On 31 July 2015, the GC adopted yet another judgment
in the France Telecom saga.14 This judgment follows the
CJEU’s annulment of the GC’s initial judgment and the
referral of the case to the GC, so that it would be judged
in first instance once again. This time the GC annuls the
Commission’s decision on the grounds that it had failed
to correctly apply the private investor principle.
The measures at issue concerned a series of declara-
tions made by the French public officials in the early
2000s when FT was going through some financial diffi-
culties. In this sense, the French Minister of Economy,
Finance and Industry had declared on 12 July 2002 that
the State would support FT if the financial difficulties
persisted. Similar declarations were made, subsequently,
on 13 September and 2 October 2002. In December 2002,
the French State published a shareholder loan proposal
that consisted in the opening of a credit line. The offer
was neither accepted nor executed.
In substance, the Commission decided in 2004 that
there was an incompatible aid but that it could not be
recovered owing to the principle of legal certainty and
the protection of legitimate expectations. The GC ruled
that there was no aid owing to the lack of transfer of State
resources (lack of specific link between State resources
14 Joined Cases T-425/04 RENV, T-444/04 RENV, France and Orange v
Commission, EU:T:2015:450.
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and each measure) and the CJEU eventually annulled that
judgment (too strict concept of State resources) and re-
ferred the case back to the GC, having not ruled on
several pleas.
The GC observed that the Commission had limited
the application of the private investor principle to the
declarations made by the public officials. The Court
noted that this was an erroneous application because as
the Commission itself acknowledged, it did not possess
the necessary information enabling it to take a position
on whether the declarations on their own amounted to
State aid. Since the Commission had found that the
declarations and the shareholder loan proposal consti-
tuted a State aid, the principle should have also been
applied to the shareholder loan proposal (paras 205–207
and 212 of the judgment). When applying this principle,
the Court observed that the Commission needed to place
itself at the time when the measure was adopted, in this
case, December 2002. The Commission, on the other
hand, had placed itself in July 2002 (para 222 of the
judgment).
Moreover, the Court noted that the comparison of
the State’s behaviour with a private investor has to be
done taking into consideration the ‘available informa-
tion’ and the ‘foreseeable evolution’ at the time when
the decisions were taken. Although the Court recog-
nises that the available information can cover events
and objective elements of the past, that does not mean
that these elements and events constitute, on their
own, in a determining way, the reference framework
for the application of the private investor principle.
On the contrary, the Court notes that given the need
to perform a prospective analysis, one cannot exclude
taking into consideration more recent elements in so
far as these elements are decisive for the prospective
analysis. The Court found that the Commission had
thus failed to take into account elements that decisive-
ly influenced the French State decision (paras 227–230
of the judgment).
Lastly, the Court dismissed the Commission’s allega-
tion according to which the declarations made by the
French State were detrimental from a legal and economic
perspective. In this sense, the Court noted that in order
for those declarations to amount to a firm commitment,
they would need to be sufficiently precise, clear, and
firm. It is not sufficient that the market perceives such
declarations as a firm commitment. Similarly, the Court
found that from the nature of those declarations, one
could not infer such a firm commitment (paras 234–236
of the judgment).
V. Compensation for public service
obligations or a service of general
economic interest (SGEI)
A. Case C-690/13 Trapeza Eurobank Ergasias AE
v Agrotiki Trapeza tis Ellados AE (ATE) and Pavlos
Sidiropoulos
In order to compensate the elevated risks of granting
loans in the agricultural sector, the Greek bank ATE was
granted, by virtue of a law, certain privileges. These privi-
leges comprised the following: (i) the right to register a
mortgage over immovable property of the debtor without
having to conclude a loan agreement, (ii) the right to seek
enforcement with an ordinary private document, and (iii)
an exemption from fees and duties during the registration
of the mortgage and the enforcement. ATE had concluded
a loan agreement with a farmer, which gave it a privileged
status as a creditor. In the context of a dispute with
another creditor of that same farmer, the national court
referred questions to the CJEU as to whether the grant-
ing of these privileges amount to State aid, and if they
do, whether the procedure of Article 108 (3) must be
followed.15
The CJEU indicated that it is up to the national court
to determine whether the privileges granted to ATE
amounted to State aid on the basis of the State aid case
law outlined by the Court in its ruling. The Court
observed that it could not be excluded that those privi-
leges fell within the scope of Article 107 (1) TFEU. In
particular, the CJEU noted that the exemption from fees
is capable of depriving the treasury of certain sources li-
quidity, and, therefore to reduce the latter’s budget. The
exemption, therefore, reduces the burden normally
imposed on the budget of a bank, thereby conferring
and economic advantage over its competitors. On the
basis of the file submitted to the Court, it would seem
that only ATE benefits from this advantage, which would
mean that the measure is selective. Lastly, the Court
noted that it could not be excluded that the exemption
had the effect of strengthening ATE’s position in relation
to competing banks active in intra-European trade
making it more difficult for banks established in other
Member States from penetrating the market (paras 26–
28 of the judgment).
The Court, however, noted that these privileges will
not amount to State aid if they constitute a compensa-
tion for the performance by ATE of its public service
obligations. The Court, then, left it to the national court
to determine whether this is the case in line with Altmark
15 Case C-690/13 Trapeza Eurobank Ergasias AE v Agrotiki Trapeza tis Ellados
AE (ATE) and Pavlos Sidiropoulos, EU:C:2015:235.
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criteria (para 34 of the judgment). As regards the con-
sequences of finding that the privileges amount to aid, the
CJEU observed that these will vary depending on whether
the aid is new or existing. Lastly, the Court noted that
if the national court found that the aid was new and that
the Greek authorities had failed to notify the aid, the na-
tional court would have to exclude the application of the
relevant national provisions insofar as they are incompat-
ible with the Treaty (paras 37 and 53 of the judgment).
B. Case T-57/11 Castelnou Energı´a, SL v
European Commission
On 29 September 2010, the Commission authorised the
State aid measure notified by Spain in favour of electrical
energy production from indigenous coal. Under this
measure, the ten electricity power plants identified in an
annex to a Royal Decree were required to source coal of
Spanish origin (‘indigenous coal’), the price of which is
higher than that of other fuels, and to produce certain
volumes of electricity from that coal.
In order to overcome the difficulties in accessing the
daily market for the sale of electricity faced by these
power plants, given the high price of the coal which they
are required to use, the contested measure introduced a
‘preferential dispatch mechanism’. The preferential dis-
patch mechanism provided, in essence, that the electri-
city produced by those power plants must be bought in
preference to the electricity produced by power plants
using other fuels and by those operating on a combined
cycle, which is withdrawn from the daily energy market
in order to ensure the sale on that market of electricity
volumes produced from indigenous coal by the benefi-
ciary power plants. The Commission found that although
the requirements imposed on the owners of the power
plants were in accordance with the operation of a SGEI
justified on the ground of security of electricity supply,
the measure in question did not satisfy the Altmark
criteria. Although constituting State aid, the aid was
authorised pursuant to Article 106(2) TFEU. On 3 De-
cember 2014, the GC adopted a judgment confirming
the Commission’s decision.16
In this regard, the GC dismissed the applicants plea
that the Commission infringed its procedural rights by
failing to initiate the formal investigation procedure pro-
vided for in Article 108(2) TFEU. In this regard, the
Court observed that, contrary to the applicants’ asser-
tions, the length of the preliminary procedure was not
excessive and therefore was not an indicator that the
Commission experienced ‘serious difficulties’ in establish-
ing whether the aid was compatible. Since Spain’s initial
notification was subsequently supplemented with addition-
al information, the relevant starting date for the prelimin-
ary assessment is the date when the Commission received
the response to its last information request. Therefore, con-
trary to what the applicant claimed, the Commission had
adopted its decision within the 2-month period (paras 62–
68 of the judgment). Similarly, the subsequent information
exchanges between the Commission and Spain were also
not an indicator that the Commission was having ‘serious
difficulties’. Indeed, through its information requests, the
Commission was simply seeking information that would
enable it to understand whether the contested measure sat-
isfied the conditions of Article 106(2) TFEU. That request
for information cannot, therefore, be regarded, in itself, as
being indicative of the existence of serious difficulties
(paras 71–73 of the judgment).
Moreover, the fact that the Commission had asked
Spain to amend the contested measure does not consti-
tute an indicator that the Commission had serious diffi-
culties. To suggest the opposite is to ignore the objective
of Article 108(2) and the preliminary procedure. In fact,
the Court observed that in accordance with the objective
of this provision and the Commission’s duty of good
administration, the Commission may, during the pre-
liminary procedure, engage in a dialogue with the notify-
ing Member State to amend the measure if necessary,
without it being necessary to initiate the formal investiga-
tion procedure (para 75 of the judgment). The GC also
dismissed the applicants’ argument according to which
the Commission had carried out an incomplete assess-
ment of the contested measure. In this sense, the Court
noted that the Commission was not required to perform
a separate analysis of each of the components of the
measure (the financial compensation paid to the electri-
city producers, the preferential dispatch mechanism, and
the obligation to purchase indigenous coal—para 99 of
the judgment).
Regarding the definition of a SGEI, the Court recalled
that Member States enjoy a wide discretion in defining
SGEI and that the Commission’s control is limited to
identifying manifest errors. This limited review may
include a prospective assessment, particularly where it is
the existence of a risk which is subject to review. More-
over, the Court’s review of the Commission’s assessment
is also limited, and when conducting its review, the Court
must determine the Commission’s assessment is ‘suffi-
ciently plausible’ (para 136 of the judgment). In order to
16 Case T-57/11 Castelnou Energı´a, SL v European Commission,
EU:T:2014:1021.
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conclude that Spain had not committed a manifest error
of assessment in claiming that the power plant running
on indigenous coal risked being closed, the Commission
took into account various elements. It considered the
combined effects of the economic recession and other
structural aspects of the electricity market in Spain, such
as the increasing proportion of electricity produced from
renewable energy sources and the isolation of the Spanish
electricity market from other European markets. Follow-
ing an analysis of the Commission’s assessment, the GC
concluded that it was sufficiently plausible and that the
Commission had, therefore, not committed a manifest
error (paras 138–146 of the judgment).
Concerning the Commission’s review of the propor-
tionality of a SGEI, the Court recalled, that this review
was also restricted. For its part, the Court’s review of
the Commission’s assessment regarding the proportion-
ality of the measure is even more limited given that the
Commission’s assessment relates to complex economic
facts. Therefore, the Court noted that in order to render
‘implausible’ the Commission’s acknowledgement that
the measure is appropriate ‘the arguments and evidence
put forward by the applicant must be particularly detailed
and based on any specific features of the present case’. The
Court concluded that this was not so in the present case
and that the Commission was not required, in the con-
text of its restricted review, to carry out a comparative
analysis of all the measures which could be capable of
attaining the general interest objective pursued (paras
150–156 and 171 of the judgment).
Another aspect of the judgment that is worth men-
tioning is the Court’s analysis of plea according to
which the Commission breached Treaty provisions and
secondary legislation other than State aid rules. The
Court recalled the case law according to which, the
Commission is required to assess the compatibility of
an aid with other provisions only where the aspects of
aid are so inextricably linked to the object of the aid
that it is impossible to evaluate them separately. The
Court found that such inextricable links existed in this
instance and that therefore the Commission was
required to assess the compatibility of the measure with
other provisions (paras 181 and 182 of the judgment).
However, the Court observed that such an obligation
only applied, in this instance, with regard to the free
movement of goods provisions. No such obligation
exists with regard to EU environmental protection
rules. Unlike the free movement of goods, the protec-
tion of the environment does not ‘constitute, per se, one
of the components of that internal market’ (paras 186–189
of the judgment). The GC therefore rejected the applica-
tion for annulment.
VI. The concept of ‘serious difficulties’
A. Case T-500/12 Ryanair v European
Commission
On 25 November 2014, the GC annulled the Commis-
sion’s decision not to open a formal procedure regarding
an Irish tax exemption in the aviation sector.17 Ireland
had introduced a tax to be paid by on-line operators in
respect of ‘every departure of a passenger on an aircraft
from an airport’ located in Ireland. Initially, there were
two different tax rates applied, depending on the dis-
tance travelled (300 km) but following the Commission
investigation the Ireland modified the legislation and
introduced a single tax rate. Transfer and transit passen-
gers were exempt from paying this tax.
Ryanair brought a complaint before the European
Commission alleging that these exemptions constituted
an aid for the airline companies Air Lingus and Aer Aran,
who had a lot of passengers and flights that were exempted.
Moreover, it argued that the flat-rate amount of the tax
accounted for a higher proportion of the ticket price for
low-cost carriers than for traditional airlines. Lastly, Ryanair
alleged that the initial lower tax rate applied to shorter
travel distances benefitted Aer Aran since more than 50%
of its passengers travelled less than 300 km from Dublin
airport.
Following a preliminary investigation initiated in re-
sponse to a complaint from Ryanair, the Commission
decided not to open a formal investigation with regard
to the tax exemption. It did so on the ground that the
measure did not constitute State aid because it formed
an integral part of the nature and logic of the system of
reference, since it resulted in passengers being taxed in
the same way independently of the route travelled and
thus ensured that the tax was not levied twice on a
journey to a final destination. The Commission did,
however, decide to initiate a formal investigation with
regard to the lower tax rate. Ryanair challenged the
Commission’s decision to not initiate a formal investiga-
tion before the GC. Ryanair maintained that indicia
concerning the preliminary procedure and the content
of the decision evidence that the Commission enter-
tained serious doubts as to the compatibility of the
measure and should have therefore opened a formal
investigation.
With regard to the alleged excessive length of the pre-
liminary procedure, the Court recalls that when a pre-
17 Case T-512/11 Ryanair v European Commission, EU:T:2014:989.
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liminary investigation is born from a complaint, the
Commission cannot prolong that investigation indefin-
itely because the purpose of that investigation is simply
to allow the Commission to form an initial opinion on
the classification of the measures and their compatibility
with the internal market. The Court found that the
period of 24 months between the reception of complaint
and the adoption the contested decision exceeded the
period normally required for a preliminary investigation.
The fact that several measures had to be analysed by the
Commission and that a formal investigation had been
opened in respect of one of those measures does not
undermine that conclusion. Indeed, the Court observed
that the Commission had not explained the ‘specific use-
fulness’ of carrying out an overall analysis of the five mea-
sures. In particular, it had not explained what was the
usefulness of not separating the investigation of the
measure which led to the initiation of the formal investiga-
tion procedure from the other measures, if those measures,
including the disputed one, raised no doubts. Furthermore,
it is not apparent from the file that there had been
exchanges which contributed to extending the length of the
preliminary investigation (paras 68–74 of the judgment).
The Court observed that the Commission accepted
Ireland’s explanation according to which the exemption
from the tax applies to the first leg of the journey in
the case transit or transfer passengers (para 83 of the
judgment). The Court pointed out that this form of ex-
emption was neither coherent with the other informa-
tion provided to the Commission, nor was it coherent
with the nature and logic of the system. The examples
contained in the table provided by the Irish authorities,
and reproduced in the Commission’s decision do not
support the interpretation of the exemption endorsed by
the Commission. In this regard, while the exemption
seems to apply to journey from Dublin to New York via
Ireland, it does not apply to the journey from New York
to Dublin via Shannon. The Commission should have
asked the Irish authorities for further information
asking for further examples of how the exemption is to
be applied (para 88 of the judgment). Second, there are
clear differences between the Irish and UK exemptions,
so the Commission cannot rely on the legality of the UK
exemption (para 90 of the judgment). Third, the invoca-
tion of the intention to avoid double taxation does no
support the example provided by the Irish authorities,
according to which it is the first flight which is not taxed
(para 93 of the judgment). Lastly, the Irish authorities
acknowledged that passengers taking two flights to arrive
to final destination (without using a single reservation
or with a 6 h interval) would not benefit from the tax ex-
emption (para 99 of the judgment).
VII. The recovery of State aid
A. Case C-674/13 European Commission v
Federal Republic of Germany
On January 2012, the Commission adopted a decision
finding that Deutsche Post (‘DP’) had benefited from
State aid linked to the financing of pensions of civil ser-
vants working for DP. The Commission thus ordered the
recovery of the aid and a reform of the regime going
forward, without stipulating specific amounts in the de-
cision. In its decision, the Commission distinguished
between the aid granted to DP for civil servants working
in services with regulated tariffs and aid granted to DP
for civil servants working in non-regulated tariffs. The
aid granted for civil servants working in regulated
services was compatible, whereas the aid granted for civil
servants working in non-regulated services was not.
Regulated services are defined as those where DP holds a
dominant position and where tariffs are regulated. When it
came to executing the Commission’s recovery decision,
Germany refused to carry out an autonomous assessment
to determine whether the B2B parcel service constituted,
within the relevant period, a distinct product market from
the B2C parcel service. The Commission brought an action
against Germany for failing to fulfil its obligations.18
In its judgment of 6 May 2015, the Court recalled
that according to the case law, the Commission is not
required to fix the exact amount of aid that needs to be
recovered and can simply limit itself to giving indica-
tions that enable Germany to determine the amount
itself (para 40 of the judgment). Since the character of
a regulated service is linked to the beneficiary holding
a dominant position in the relevant market, it is only
logical that one would need to carry out an autonomous
assessment to determine the relevant market. Therefore,
the Court confirmed that Germany should have per-
formed an autonomous assessment to determine whether
the B2B and B2C services belonged to different product
markets and should have communicated the outcome of
that assessment to the Commission (paras 48 and 60 of
the judgment).
B. Case C-63/14 European Commission v French
Republic
On 8 July 2015, the CJEU found that the French Republic
had failed to fulfil its obligations by failing, in the prescribed
18 Case C-674/13 European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany,
EU:C:2015:302.
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periods, to take all the necessary measures to recover from
Socie´te´ National Corse-Mediteranee (‘SNCM’) the State aid
declared unlawful and incompatible by the Commission
Decision 2013/435/EU, to cancel all the payments of aid,
and to inform the Commission of the measures taken to
comply with that decision.19
The facts that gave rise to this judgment were as
follows. SNCM and Compagnie me´ridionale de naviga-
tion SA (‘CMN’) were awarded the public service delega-
tion for ferry services between the port of Marseille and
the Corsican ports. The delegation covered, on the one
hand, a ‘basic service’ that consisted in a permanent
‘passenger and freight’ service to be provided by SNCM
and CMN throughout the year; and on the other, an
‘additional service’ to be provided by SNCM during
peak periods. SNCM and CMN would receive an annual
compensation for performing these services. The Com-
mission found that the compensation received for the
basic service constituted an unlawful aid, whereas the
compensation for the additional service was both unlaw-
ful and incompatible. Therefore, on 3 May 2013, the
Commission ordered France to recover the sums granted
to SNCM for the purposes of compensating the add-
itional service.
Both SNCM and France challenged the Commission
decision to the General Court. In parallel, France lodged
an application for interim measures to suspend the oper-
ation decision. Both the application for interim mea-
sures before the GC and the subsequent appeal before
the CJEU were dismissed. On 29 November 2013, the
French Republic informed the Commission that the
Corsican Regional authorities had suspended payments
for the additional service with effect from the end of
July 2013. Regarding the amount of compensation be
recovered, France expressed difficulties in calculating the
amount, since the distinction between basic and add-
itional services was an artificial one since these two ser-
vices were inseparable and helped achieve the objective
of territorial continuity. In light of these circumstances,
the Commission decided to bring an action against
France for failing to fulfil its obligations under Article
108 (2) TFEU.
Regarding the recovery, the Court observed that
France had simply issued recovery orders over 2 months
after the prescribed period for an amount that was less
than that indicated by the Commission and that no
actual recover had been made. Thus, in line with prior
case law, the Court stated that simply issuing recovery
order does not amount to recovering illegal aid. Further-
more, the fact that actions for annulment had been
lodged against the decision was of no consequence and
did not have the effect of suspending the decision, absent
a decision from the GC to that effect (paras 46 and 47 of
the judgment).
The CJEU recalled the case law according to which
the exception of absolute impossibility exception is not
applicable, where ‘the defendant Member State merely
informs the Commission of the legal, political or practical
difficulties involved in implementing the decision, without
taking any real step to recover the aid form the undertak-
ings concerned, and without proposing to the Commission
any alternative arrangements for implementing the deci-
sion which could have enabled those difficulties to be over-
come’ (para 49 of the judgment). The Court dismissed
the arguments put forward by France as to why this ex-
ception should apply. Regarding the argument that the
recovery would lead to liquidation of SNCM, which
would in turn cause social unrest and undermine the ter-
ritorial continuity, the Court observed that France had
failed to show that action taken by it to put an end to
any alleged social unrest would have consequences that
France would not be able to cope with using the means
at its disposal. In this sense, even if long-term blockades
were to take place, France had not provided evidence
that would support the conclusion that France would
not be able to supply Corsica with the basic necessities
through other maritime routes or by air. Moreover, both
the recovery order and the statement of liability pre-
sented by the French Government in the collective pro-
ceedings of which SNCM is the subject, did not give rise
to any particular unrest (paras 51–54 of the judgment).
As regards the argument that the break in territorial
continuity which might occur between the cessation of
activities of SNCM and the conclusion of a new public
service delegation contract, the Court recognised that
the cessation of SNCM activities would likely reduce
ferry services in the short term. However, France had not
put forward any facts that would support the conclusion
that the reduction would have consequences on a scale
which could be regarded as making it absolutely impos-
sible to implement the decision at issue (para 56 of the
judgment).
VIII. The res judicata principle and State
aid control
This most recent case (ruled on 11 November 2015)20
concerns a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of
19 Case C-63/14 European Commission v French Republic, EU: C:2015:458. 20 Case C-505/14 Klausner Holz/Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 11 November
2015.
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State aid rules and the principle of effectiveness. It is the
second case ever since 1958 where the Court decides that
the principle of res judicata should be set aside for the
primacy of EU law, in the present case the principle of
effectiveness read in combination with State aid rules. The
other case was also a State aid case, the Lucchini case.21
Indeed, under the EU case law, State aid rules contain
such institutional competence rules that, in some cir-
cumstances, any national rule, even the principle of res
judicata, should be set aside if the application of that
national rule amounts to encroaching the exclusive com-
petence of the Commission to rule on the compatibility
of State aid.
The national proceedings leading to the reference to
the CJEU are between Klausner Holz (a purchaser of
wood) and the Land Nordrhein-Westfalen following a
failure by the Land to execute agreements to supply
wood concluded with Klausner Holz. In substance, the
dispute led to a definitive judgment declaring the con-
tracts at issue remained in force. This is now res judicata.
It should also be noted, as to the introductory factual
and legal backgrounds to this case, that, under German
law, ‘Judgments are able to become res judicata only in so
far as a ruling has been given on the complaint or the
claims asserted in counterclaims’.
The State aid issues only occurred at a later stage
when, in defence to an action for damages brought by
Klausner Holz, the Land raised, for the first time, the ar-
gument that the execution of the contracts at issue is
precluded since they constitute unlawful State aid. To
confirm this position, the Federal Republic of Germany
informed the European Commission of the existence of
that non-notified aid, which, in the opinion of that
Member State, is even incompatible with the internal
market. The Commission also received complaints from
a number of the competitors of Klausner Holz making
the same allegations of incompatibility.
The referring court requested clarification from the
Commission [relying on the Commission Notice on the
enforcement of State aid law by national courts (OJ
2009 C 85, p. 1)], but the Commission said it was
unable to state its definitive position on the application
in view of current proceedings opened following the
German’s information and the complaints. The refer-
ring court took the view, for its part, that contracts at
issue constitute State aid and that that aid was imple-
mented in breach of the third sentence of Article 108(3)
TFEU. Therefore, for the national court, the private law
contract granting unlawful State aid must be regarded
as null and void.
However, the referring court considers it was pre-
vented from drawing the consequences of that violation
of the third sentence of Article 108(3) TFEU because of
the declaratory (and definitive) judgment mentioned
above, which held that the contracts at issue remained in
force.
The CJEU was therefore asked to rule on the question
whether ‘EU law precludes, in circumstances such as those
at issue in the main proceedings, the application of a rule
of national law enshrining the principle of res judicata
from preventing a national court which has held that con-
tracts forming the subject-matter of the dispute before it
constitute State aid, within the meaning of Article 107(1)
TFEU, implemented in breach of the third sentence of
Article 108(3) TFEU, from drawing all the consequences of
that breach because of a national judicial decision which
has become definitive, which court, without examining
whether those contracts constitute State aid, has held that
the contracts remain in force’ (para 17 of the judgment).
The Court recalls first the well-known respective
roles, complementary but separate, of the Commission
(which has the exclusive competence to assess the com-
patibility of aid with the internal market) and national
courts (which safeguard, until the final decision of the
Commission, the rights of individuals faced with a pos-
sible violation of Article 108(3) TFEU).
The Court then notes that the dispute initially did not
concern, either principally or incidentally, the State aid
characteristics, within the meaning of Article 107(1)
TFEU, of the contracts at issue. Hence, that question was
not examined by the courts which it ruled at first in-
stance in the same dispute. It also notes the aims of the
disputes were to obtain a ruling that the contracts at
issue remained in force, despite the fact that the Land
had rescinded them and, then, to obtain (i) payment of
damages in respect of the non-execution of part of those
contracts, (ii) execution of another part thereof, and (iii)
certain information concerning in particular the prices
applied in the sector. It also notes that, under German
law, the principle of res judicata precludes ‘not only re-
examination, in a second action, of the pleas already ex-
pressly settled definitively, but also the raising of questions
which could have been raised in an earlier action and
which were not so raised’ (para 30 of the judgment).
The Court follows by examining the possibility of a
measure (such as the temporary suspension of the con-
tracts at issue until the adoption of the Commission de-
cision closing the procedure, which would enable that
court to satisfy its obligations under the third sentence
of Article 108(3) TFEU without actually ruling on the
21 Case C-119/05, Lucchini, EU:C:2007:434.
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validity of the contracts at issue) or the application of
the principle of interpretation in conformity with EU
law.
In the event that these possibilities were not open to
the referring national court, the Court eventually examines
the central question of opposition between the principle of
res judicata and the application of EU State aid law.
It recalls that ‘EU law does not always require a nation-
al court to disapply domestic rules of procedure conferring
finality on a judgment, even if to do so would make it pos-
sible to remedy a breach of EU law by the decision at issue’
(para 39 of the judgment).
It also recalls the well-known principles of equivalence
and effectiveness: ‘In the absence of EU legislation in this
area, the rules implementing the principle of res judicata
are a matter for the national legal order, in accordance
with the principle of the procedural autonomy of the
Member States. However, such procedural rules must not
be less favourable than those governing similar domestic
situations (principle of equivalence) and must not be
framed in such a way as to make it in practice impossible
or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by EU
law (principle of effectiveness)’ (para 40 of the judgment).
The Court follows by stating that ‘both the State au-
thorities and the recipients of State aid would be able to
circumvent the prohibition laid down in the third sentence
of Article 108(3) TFEU by obtaining, without relying on EU
law on State aid, a declaratory judgment whose effect would
enable them, definitively, to continue to implement the aid
in question over a number of years. Thus, in a case such as
that at issue in the main proceedings, a breach of EU law
would recur in respect of each new supply of wood, without
it being possible to remedy it’ (para 43 of the judgment).
This situation is likely ‘to deprive of any useful effect
the exclusive power of the Commission (. . .) to assess (. . .)
the compatibility of aid measures with the internal market’
(para 44 of the judgment). The Court notes that ‘If the
Commission, to which the Federal Republic of Germany
has in the meantime notified the aid measure constituted
by the contracts at issue, should conclude that it is incom-
patible with the internal market and order its recovery,
execution of its decision must fail if a decision of the
national court could be raised against it declaring the
contracts forming that aid to be “in force”’ (ibid).
On those grounds, the Court of Justice rules as
follows: ‘EU law precludes, in circumstances such as those
at issue in the main proceedings, the application of a rule
of national law enshrining the principle of res judicata
from preventing a national court which has held that con-
tracts forming the subject-matter of the dispute before it
constitute State aid, within the meaning of Article 107(1)
TFEU, implemented in breach of the third sentence of
Article 108(3) TFEU, from drawing all the consequences of
that breach because of a national judicial decision which
has become definitive, which court, without examining
whether those contracts constitute State aid, has held
that the contracts remain in force’ (operative part of the
judgment).
This is the second judgment, after Lucchini, where
the Court limits the res judicata principle as far as the
application of State aid rules are concerned, and in par-
ticular when the exclusive competence of the Commis-
sion is put into question by the application of that rule
of national law.
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